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1 
Provocation, NSW Style: 
Reform of the Defence of Provocation in NSW 
 
Thomas Crofts* and Arlie Loughnan** 
 
Abstract 
 
Following a high profile and controversial case in which the defendant 
successfully invoked the provocation defence, the NSW government 
established a select parliamentary committee to review the defence and its 
operation. The Committee recommended that the current defence be 
'relabelled' a defence of 'gross provocation', which was structured 
substantially along the lines of the reform recommended by the Law 
Commission for England and Wales in 2004. The NSW government has 
recently responded with a different proposal for a partial defence of 
‘extreme provocation’. This article critically evaluates the proposed 
reform of the provocation defence in NSW. 
 
 
Introduction  
 
In early 2012, Mr Chamanjot Singh was convicted of the manslaughter of his wife, 
Manpreet Kaur.
1
 Singh had been charged with murder but had successfully raised the 
defence of provocation, on the basis that he lost self-control when his wife allegedly 
told him that she was in love with someone else and threatened to have his permission 
to stay in Australia revoked. Singh was sentenced to eight years imprisonment with a 
non-parole period of 6 years.  
 
In June 2012, in the aftermath of this well-publicised and contentious trial outcome, 
and with bipartisan support, the New South Wales (NSW) government established the 
Select Committee on the Partial Defence of Provocation (the Committee) to inquire 
into and report on the partial defence of provocation. Electing to address the issue 
through a parliamentary process, rather than by referring it to the NSW Law Reform 
Commission, indicates the strong political will to promptly remedy perceived 
deficiencies in the law.
2
 The Committee's terms of reference required it to consider 
the retention of the defence, the adequacy of the defence of self-defence for victims of 
prolonged domestic and sexual violence, and any other related matters.
3
 It was able to 
consider abolition of the defence, or its amendment in light of the law in other 
jurisdictions. The Committee was unable to agree on the abolition of provocation, 
and, instead, put forward a proposal for reform closely modelled on the proposal of 
the Law Commission for England and Wales, and incorporating reforms undertaken 
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in other Australian jurisdictions. It recommended ‘relabelling’ the defence, as 'gross 
provocation', which would, as a matter of law, not be available in particular factual 
circumstances (such as when the provocation was alleged to have arisen in a 
‘domestic’ relationship) (an ‘exclusionary model’). 
 
Shortly after the Committee published its Report, the NSW Department of Attorney-
General and Justice released a response to it, in the form of a Discussion Paper, and 
an exposure draft Bill.
4
 According to the Discussion Paper, the NSW government 
intends to introduce a partial defence of ‘extreme provocation’ that would be 
available to a charge of murder only where the defendant was responding to conduct 
by the deceased that amounted to a ‘serious indictable offence’ (a ‘positive restriction 
model’), placing NSW out of step with other jurisdictions retaining provocation. As 
the Discussion Paper states, this ‘significantly tightens’ the partial defence, with the 
government stating that this proposed amendment reflects the view that, in 
contemporary society, ‘there is an expectation that people otherwise faced with 
offensive, insulting or upsetting conduct should not resort to homicide’.5 
 
This article explores the background to these reform proposals, and the areas of 
agreement and divergence between the Committee’s and the government’s reform 
proposals. It then assesses whether the government’s draft Bill offers a preferable, 
‘workable’ model for retaining the partial defence of provocation while excluding 
certain conduct from its scope. 
 
Background to the Proposed Reform 
 
It is fair to regard the Singh case as the latest in a line of cases highlighting 
problematic aspects of the defence of provocation. As such it can be seen as an excuse 
rather than a reason for the government to examine the law on provocation. Concern 
about the way in which criminal defences have been moulded around male patterns of 
behaviour and failed to reflect (indeed have silenced and excluded
6) women’s 
experiences began to filter into the political and legal area in Australia in the 1980s. A 
number of high profile cases – some in which women were convicted of murder for 
killing their abusive partners and some in which men were successful in using 
provocation to secure manslaughter convictions after killing their female partners – 
led to calls for change.
7
 Such calls were picked up by the NSW government and a 
Task Force on Domestic Violence was established, which in a report published in 
1981 recommended a number of reforms to improve access of women to appropriate 
defences.
8
 In line with the report’s recommendations, the law on provocation in NSW 
was amended in 1982 to remove the need for a sudden response to provocative 
conduct (thus allowing for recognition of cumulative provocation), to remove the 
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mandatory life term for murder and to clarify the fact that the prosecution bares the 
onus of disproving a claim that the killing was provoked.   
 
Despite subsequent reviews of the partial defence of provocation by the NSW Law 
Reform Commission in 1997,
9
 and an Attorney-General’s Working Party in 1998,10 
no legislative changes have been made to provocation since 1982.
11
 The 1997 review 
was the result of broad inquiry into the partial defences to murder (diminished 
responsibility, provocation, infanticide) while the 1998 review was prompted by the 
outrage sparked by Green
12
 when the majority of the Australian High Court failed to 
rule out the possibility that a non-violent homosexual advance could found a case of 
provocation. Instead it confirmed that the question of whether an ordinary person 
could have lost self-control depended on the jury’s evaluation of the circumstances. 
This case fuelled concern that the partial defence still operated in a gendered way, to 
protect male honour, and was in need of reform or abolition. Although the Working 
Party recommended that a non-violent homosexual advance should not be able to 
form the basis of a provocation claim (by contrast with the 1997 Law Reform 
Commission Report which recommended against legislative restrictions on the 
conduct which could give rise to the partial defence
13
), no action was taken to change 
provocation in NSW, and the push for reform remained ‘faltering and incomplete’.14 
This situation contrasts with the progress of reform efforts in other Australian 
criminal jurisdictions (three of which have abolished the partial defence,
15
 while 
others have implemented reforms). It is therefore no surprise that the Singh case again 
ignited debate about the future of provocation in NSW.  
 
Here, for clarity, it should be noted that as a common law-based federation of states 
and territories, Australia comprises nine criminal jurisdictions. The Commonwealth 
constitution grants specific powers to the commonwealth (federal) government with 
the remaining powers exercised by each state.
16
 The commonwealth government has 
limited powers to govern crime where the crime falls within a specific federal head of 
power, for example, corporate crime pursuant to the federal corporations law or where 
it is incidental to one of the powers contained in the constitution. However, most 
criminal law is state based and, hence, varies across Australia, with a broad structural 
division between those states which have adopted criminal codes (code jurisdictions) 
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and those which have not (common law jurisdictions). Of the various Australian 
jurisdictions, only the Australian Capital Territory, NSW, Queensland, the Northern 
Territory and South Australia retain provocation as a defence to murder.
17
 
 
The provocation defence currently operative in NSW will look familiar to lawyers 
from other common law jurisdictions. The Crimes Act 1900 NSW provides that, 
where, on a trial for murder, if the conduct causing the death was the result of 'loss of 
self-control' that was 'induced' by 'any conduct of the deceased (including grossly 
insulting words or gestures)', and that conduct was such as 'could have induced an 
ordinary person in the position of the accused to have so far lost self-control as to 
have formed an intent to kill, or inflict grievous bodily harm', the onus will be on the 
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the killing was not done under 
provocation.
18
  
 
The NSW Parliament Select Committee was unable to reach agreement on whether 
the partial defence of provocation should be abolished. The lack of consensus around 
abolition (or, indeed, retention in its current form) mirrors the strikingly polarised 
academic and public debates about the on-going validity of the provocation defence.
19
 
Based on the public records generated by the Parliamentary Inquiry, these debates 
played out in the submissions the Committee received and in its public hearings. The 
Committee's Report identifies four main concerns with the defence: gender bias, that 
the defence is 'anachronistic and archaic', that it promotes a culture of victim blaming 
and that the defence itself is hard for juries to understand.
20
 Balanced against these 
concerns was the Committee's view that provocation is valuable for women who have 
been subject to long-term domestic abuse, on the basis that 'provocation may 
appropriately reflect their legal and moral responsibility' and because self-defence 
may be hard to establish.
21
 
 
Rather than recommend abolition, the Committee developed a model for reform of the 
defence. The proposal draws heavily on the model for the reform of provocation (as 
'gross provocation') put forward by the Law Commission for England and Wales in 
2004 and in 2006,
22
 as well as reforms undertaken in other Australian jurisdictions to 
exclude provocation in certain circumstances. As is well known, the ‘gross 
provocation’ proposal was not taken up in England and Wales. While accepting the 
Law Commission’s conclusion that the law of provocation was in need of reform, the 
British government released its own consultation paper containing distinct reform 
proposals. With the stated aim of reducing the role of the partial defence of 
provocation, the British government proposed abolition of the defence of provocation 
and also a jettisoning of the term ‘provocation’, which was seen to have negative 
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connotations.
23
 Similarly, the impetus behind the Committee’s proposed reform in 
NSW is to restrict the availability of the partial defence.
24
 Accordingly, the bar was to 
be raised to require 'grossly provocative' conduct, and additional amendments would 
be made to ensure that it would not be possible to raise the defence when the 
provocation was alleged to have arisen in a specified range of factual circumstances.. 
 
As mentioned above, since the publication of the Committee’s Report, the NSW 
Department of Attorney General and Justice has released a response to the Report, 
and an exposure draft Bill. The relatively short timeframe in which the draft 
legislation has appeared indicates there is significant political will to reform the law. 
As was the case regarding the law in England and Wales, the government’s response 
takes the law in a different direction from that recommended by the Committee. 
Contrary to the recommendations of the Committee, the Bill provides for a partial 
defence of ‘extreme provocation’, which is to be available only where the defendant 
was responding to conduct that amounted to a ‘serious indictable offence’. The draft 
Bill follows the recommendations of the Committee, however, in providing that a 
‘non-violent sexual advance’ will not be able to ground a defence of ‘extreme 
provocation’.   
 
Proposed Reform I – Areas of Substantial Agreement between the Committee’s 
and the NSW Government 
 
The Trigger - ‘Extreme Provocation’  
 
According to the NSW government’s draft Bill, the current partial defence of 
provocation is to be ‘recast’ as a partial defence of ‘extreme provocation’, which will 
continue to be available to murder only.
25
 The Committee had recommended that the 
partial defence be 'renamed' 'the partial defence of gross provocation'.
26
 Although the 
NSW government response expressly rejects the term ‘gross’ (on the basis that it has 
multiple meanings
27
), it does not seem that there is much in the different names 
adopted in the government response and the Committee Report. Renaming as either 
‘extreme provocation’ or ‘gross provocation’ represents a desirable step in that, while 
not claiming a clean and definitive break with the defence of provocation (as has 
happened in England and Wales), it clearly indicates that the defence has been 
changed significantly and thus, the enactment of new legislation should foster a fresh 
jurisprudence on the defence. In addition, such a 'renaming' should serve a labeling 
purpose in that it indicates that only particularly grievous cases of provocation are 
captured by the defence, and are able to provide an excuse for defendants who have 
resorted to lethal violence.
28
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In its Discussion Paper, the NSW government refers to the rationale for provocation 
as the reduction in the moral culpability of an individual who kills under 
circumstances of provocation.
29
 In a similar vein, the Report stated that the 
Committee had been persuaded by the views of the Law Commission for England and 
Wales that the moral basis for the provocation defence properly lies in the defendant's 
justifiable sense of being seriously wronged.
30
 Holding that provocation has been 
raised successfully in cases in which, while appropriately labelled provocative, are not 
'so grossly provocative as to justify or excuse (even partially) the taking of human 
life', the Committee concluded that the partial defence should be limited to 'grossly 
provocative' conduct, and available only in circumstances that are 'more extreme than 
ordinary life events'.
31
 But, in restricting ‘extreme provocation’ to a defendant who 
responded to a ‘serious indictable offence’, the NSW government’s response departs 
from the Committee’s recommendation and ensures that the defence will be available 
only in an extremely narrow category of 'more extreme than ordinary life events'. This 
is discussed further below. 
 
The proposed ‘extreme provocation’ defence can be contrasted with the reform that 
was adopted in England and Wales in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Prior to 
reform, and as reflected in the debates in the House of Lords and the Privy Council, 
most notably in R v Smith (Morgan)
32
 and Attorney-General v Holley,
33
 provocation 
had come to be dogged by controversy about its breadth and its relationship with the 
partial defence of diminished responsibility (controversies which played out 
specifically in relation to the kind of characteristics that could be accorded to the 
reasonable person to be taken into account for the objective part of the defence). The 
Ministry of Justice proposed in its Consultation Paper that provocation be abolished, 
and replaced with what was initially to be two new partial defences, covering killing 
in response to fear of serious violence, and killing in response to words and conduct 
causing a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged.
34
 To narrow the scope of the 
latter, it was proposed that it would be anchored in a statutory provision providing 
that discovering that a partner is having, or had, an affair cannot found the defence, 
and that the threshold for the defence should be raised to allow words and conduct to 
found the defence only in exceptional circumstances.
35
 This proposal was adopted as 
the new two-limbed partial defence to murder of ‘loss of control’ in 2009.36 
 
Neither the NSW government’s response, nor the NSW Committee’s proposal 
includes any express requirement that the loss of self-control be attributable to things 
done or said which ‘constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character’.37 The 
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inclusion of this provision in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 amendment to the 
Homicide Act 1957 reflects the fact that, rather than accept the ‘gross provocation’ 
model recommended by its Law Commission, the British government elected to enact 
a new defence of ‘loss of control’. Such an inclusion would have been unnecessary in 
the NSW Committee’s proposal because of the shift to require that the ‘justifiable 
sense of being seriously wronged’ must have been caused by ‘gross provocation’. 
Now that, if enacted, ‘extreme provocation’ will be available only in response to 
conduct which constitutes a ‘serious indictable offence’, the bar will be raised higher 
still, such that provocation will only be available in extraordinary (and rare) 
situations. 
 
Here it should be noted that neither the NSW Committee recommendation nor the 
government response recommend extension of ‘extreme provocation’ to include fear 
of serious violence on the part of the accused as an alternative ground for the defence. 
Arguably, this step is unnecessary in NSW because a partial defence of excessive 
self-defence was introduced into the Crimes Act 1900 through the Crimes 
Amendment (Self-defence) Act 2001.
38
  
 
The test for provocation 
 
In NSW at present, as in England and Wales before its abolition, provocation contains 
both a subjective and an objective limb. As mentioned above, in relation to a murder 
charge, the partial defence of provocation in NSW requires a 'loss of self-control' that 
was 'induced' by 'any conduct of the deceased', and that conduct was such as 'could 
have induced an ‘ordinary person’ in the position of the accused to have so far lost 
self-control as to have formed an intent to kill, or inflict grievous bodily harm'.
39
 The 
Committee had not suggested any change to the test for provocation, which would 
thus have carried over to ‘gross provocation’. The NSW government has proposed 
that ‘extreme provocation’ will be available ‘if and only if’ the lethal act of the 
accused was in response to conduct of the deceased ‘towards or affecting’ the 
accused, the conduct was a ‘serious indictable offence’ which caused the accused to 
lose self-control, and the conduct of the deceased could have caused an ‘ordinary 
person’ to lose self-control to the extent of intending to kill or inflict grievous bodily 
harm on the deceased. Other than with respect to the limitation to ‘serious indictable 
offence’, which is discussed separately below, this change in wording does not 
represent a substantive change to the test for provocation. 
 
In relation to the subjective limb of the test for provocation – that the person lost self-
control – the Committee had expressed concern that this phrase adds unnecessary 
complexity and ambiguity to the defence.
40
 Arguably, developments in case law that 
have loosened the requirement of a loss of control in so-called slow-burn provocation 
cases,
41
 have compounded difficulties surrounding the loss of control. Yet, despite 
such changes, some submissions to the Inquiry claimed that this element of the 
defence continues to make it easier to use for men (particularly where they kill an 
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intimate partner, as in the Singh case) than for women who kill after suffering long-
term abuse.
42
 In addition, some submissions to the Parliamentary Inquiry suggested 
that this element of the defence suffers from fundamental flaws in that it ‘lacks a clear 
foundation in science or medicine’, and argued that there is no appropriate measure to 
assess whether or not a person has lost self-control.
43
 
 
According to the Committee, removing the requirement of a loss of self-control would 
have been desirable because such a move would focus attention on the nature of the 
provocation (the provocative act) and the defendant’s response to that provocation.44 
Such a move had been recommended by the Law Commission for England and Wales 
in 2004,
45
 but was not adopted when the new defence of ‘loss of self-control’ was 
introduced through the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
46
 Although it favoured 
removing this requirement, the Committee did not actually advocate the removal of a 
'loss of self-control' in its recommendations, and the NSW government draft Bill 
retains reference to ‘loss of self-control’ on the basis that replacing it with a 
requirement of a ‘justifiable sense of being seriously wronged’ could significantly 
expand the law.
47
  
 
Despite perceived difficulties with the concept of loss of self-control, and the 
possibility that it could act as a barrier to an abused person also raising self-defence, it 
is appropriate to retain this element. Without it there is a danger that provocation 
would be opened up to cold-blooded killing.
48
 Furthermore, concerns that the 
requirement causes problems for victims of abuse responding to the violence after a 
period of delay are already addressed by the statutory provision which states that there 
is no rule of law that provocation is negatived if the act or omission causing death was 
not sudden.
49
 Indeed, the draft Bill makes this clearer by stating that ‘[c]onduct of the 
deceased may constitute extreme provocation even if the conduct did not occur 
immediately before the act causing death’. More fundamentally, retaining the 
requirement of a loss of control is in line with the historical trajectory of the defence 
from a justification to an excuse.
50
 In the current era, provocation centres on a ‘loss of 
control’ and it is this that (partially) excuses a defendant: the ‘loss of control’ affects 
the accused’s culpability for the murder with which he or she is charged and thus this 
element of provocation is crucial to the reduced culpability conveyed via the 
defence.
51
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The Committee also recommended that the objective limb of the provocation defence 
– assessing the gravity of the provocation to an ordinary person and the power of self-
control of the ordinary person – be retained, and the NSW government has followed 
this recommendation in its draft Bill. As the main issue here seemed to be jury 
comprehension of the elements of the defence, this is discussed under this heading. 
 
Jury Understanding of the Elements of the Defence 
 
The NSW government response does not give consideration to the issue of jury 
capacity to understand the elements of the defence. The Committee had noted the 
concerns that the test for provocation is too complex for juries, but agreed with the 
submission from the NSW Bar Association that such concerns were 'overstated', 
concluding that the existing test for provocation 'strikes a balance in allowing for the 
partial defence to be properly used'.
52
 It therefore did not recommend any substantial 
change to the test, such that it would continue to contain a subjective limb (discussed 
above) and a two limb objective test – assessing the gravity of the provocation to an 
ordinary person and the power of self-control of the ordinary person.  
 
Given the complexities surrounding the ordinary person test, it would have been 
preferable to clarify the ordinary person test along the lines recommended by the Law 
Commission for England and Wales. The objective test in provocation is designed to 
act as a barrier, representing the standard of control that can be expected of each 
member of the community. Expressly requiring that a person of the same age and 
‘ordinary temperament’ ‘might have reacted in the same or similar way’ would go a 
significant way towards dealing with the difficulties created by the objective limb of 
the current defence. The reference to a person of ‘ordinary temperament’ is something 
a jury is likely to grasp readily.
53
 This requirement would also work well in tandem 
with the other changes recommended by the NSW Committee, including the reference 
to ‘justifiable’ to qualify a defendant’s ‘sense of being seriously wronged’, and with 
specific exclusions from the scope of the defence where it is considered that no 
ordinary person should have lost his or her self-control (concerns about an 
exclusionary model discussed further below). This combination would have further 
invoked community standards about what may give rise to a ‘justifiable sense of 
being seriously wronged’.54 
 
Onus of Proof  
 
The NSW government’s draft Bill regarding the partial defence of ‘extreme 
provocation’ does not propose to alter the onus of proof. In response to the 
submissions it received, the Committee had considered the option of reversing the 
onus of proof for provocation. This would have meant the defendant had the onus of 
proof, to a balance of probabilities standard – an approach that was adopted in 
Queensland in 2011.
55
 The proposal to reverse the onus of proof was problematic and 
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it is inconsistent with the history of provocation.
56
 Furthermore, it was unwarranted if 
a reformulated defence of ‘gross provocation’ or ‘extreme provocation’ is to be 
constructed around a comparison with the ‘ordinary person’ (a comparison that marks 
the defence out from those defences with reverse burdens
57
). In the end, the 
Committee could not come to a 'firm conclusion' on this point, and made no 
recommendation about it.
58
 It is pleasing to see that the NSW government response 
also gives no consideration to this option. 
 
Proposed Reform II – Where the Committee and the Government part Company 
 
An ‘Exclusionary Model’ 
 
The adoption of an exclusionary model – the express unavailability of the defence 
where it is alleged to have arisen in certain factual circumstances – was the core 
feature of the Committee’s proposed defence of ‘gross provocation’. This feature of 
the proposed reform attempted to address the rather fraught judicial debate over what 
factors can be attributed to the ordinary (reasonable) person for the purposes of the 
defence. The courts’ answer to this question has varied according to whether the 
characteristic is alleged to have affected the gravity of the provocation or to have 
rendered the defendant less able to control him or herself. In relation to the former, all 
kinds of characteristics – including discreditable ones – may be taken into account if 
they become the subject of the taunt or the action (words or conduct) to which the 
defendant reacts. In relation to the latter, the approach has been more restrictive in 
NSW with only age taken into account.
59
  
 
In order to further restrict the scope of the partial defence, over and above the 
restriction to ‘gross provocation’, the Committee had recommended that the statutory 
defence of 'gross provocation' exclude provocation that arises in certain contexts. 
These contexts were: where the provocation is self-induced, where it consists of a 
'non-violent sexual advance' or where it arises out of a 'domestic relationship' between 
the defendant and the victim or another person.
60
 An express exclusion of 'gross 
provocation' that is self-induced mirrors the current law of provocation and is not 
controversial. But, in referencing non-violent sexual advances, and domestic 
relationships, the Committee's proposal went beyond the model provided by the Law 
Commission for England and Wales. Each of these two exclusions is considered in 
turn. 
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In recommending that the partial defence of 'gross provocation' not be available to 
defendants who respond to a 'non-violent sexual advance by the victim',
61
 the 
Committee had addressed concerns raised in a significant number of submissions, and 
the legacy of cases involving so-called 'homosexual advance'. The Committee 
expressed concern that the acceptance of non-violent homosexual advances as a basis 
for provocation condones homophobia.
62
 The Committee's recommendation is in line 
with reform in two other Australian jurisdictions that have retained provocation.
63
 
Such a recommendation had already been made, as noted above, in NSW by an 
Attorney-General’s Inquiry into the defence as a result of the outrage that followed 
the decision of Green (1997) 148 ALR 659.
64
  
 
Excluding provocation in cases of a ‘non-violent sexual advance by the victim’ is 
appropriate given that, in the words of Kirby J, dissenting, in Green:   
 
In my view, the "ordinary person" in Australian society today is not so homophobic as to 
respond to a non-violent sexual advance by a homosexual person as to form an intent to kill or 
to inflict grievous bodily harm. […] the notion that the ordinary 22 year-old male (the age of 
the accused) in Australia today would so lose self-control as to form an intent to kill or 
grievously injure the deceased because of a non-violent sexual advance by a homosexual 
person is unconvincing. It should not be accepted by this Court as an objective standard 
applicable in contemporary Australia.
65
 
 
Barring a non-violent homosexual advance as a basis for provocation is thus in line 
with contemporary movements to ensure equality and remove bias against 
homosexual persons.
66
 This had received significant media attention, which, overall, 
seems to have been positive.
67
 It had also sparked Tammy Franks, an MP for The 
Green Party to lay the Criminal Law Consolidation (Provocation) Amendment Bill 
2013 before the Parliament of South Australia in May 2013. This Bill proposes to 
introduce the following limitation on the defence of provocation: ‘[f]or the purposes 
of proceedings in which the defence of provocation may be raised, conduct of a 
sexual nature by a person does not constitute provocation merely because the person 
was the same sex as the defendant.’ Plans to take such a step in Queensland in 2012 
were abandoned when the government changed in March 2012.
68
 In explaining the 
reluctance to make any such change the Attorney-General noted that amendments 
made to the Criminal Code of Queensland in 2011 to prohibit words from forming the 
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basis of a provocation claim (other than in extreme circumstances) were sufficient to 
make the defence harder to apply.
69
 
 
The proposed defence of 'gross provocation' would also have excluded provocation 
that arises in 'domestic' relationships. Here, the Committee found itself in a dilemma 
familiar to law reform agencies in several common law jurisdictions: the Committee 
sought to restrict access to the defence by men who, after inflicting long term abuse, 
kill their female partners, and – at the same time – ensure the defence is available to 
women who might lash out at abusers after suffering years of abuse.
70
 Overall, the 
Committee was concerned that the defence not be available to defendants who 
respond with lethal force to conduct that involves individuals exercising their rights to 
autonomy and choice.
71
 
 
According to the Committee’s recommendation, the proposed defence of 'gross 
provocation' would not have been available where the defendant kills a person with 
whom he or she is in a 'domestic relationship', and the provocation is based on 
anything done or believed to be done by the deceased to end the relationship, 'change 
the nature of the relationship' or indicate that 'the relationship may, should or will end, 
or that there may be, should or will be a change to the nature of the relationship'.
72
 
'Domestic relationship' is defined broadly along the same lines as in the Crimes 
(Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW).
73
 While in England and Wales 
the main exclusion is that provocation may not be based on ‘sexual infidelity’,74 the 
NSW Committee drew upon examples from other Australian jurisdictions in an effort 
to exclude a broader range of circumstances that it regarded as inappropriate grounds 
for provocation. The prohibition on provocation in relation to anything said or done, 
or believed to be said or done, to change the nature of, or end, a domestic relationship 
is broadly based on reforms undertaken to the Criminal Code of Queensland.
75
 This 
approach aimed to strike a balance by allowing the defence to continue to operate 
while denying the defence where there are, in Alan Norrie’s words, ‘bad’ grounds for 
being provoked.
76
 This point is discussed further below. 
 
The prohibition on raising the defence of ‘gross provocation’ in the context of a 
'domestic relationship' was subject to the proviso that provocation arising in this 
context may be capable of founding the defence if the circumstances are of 'a most 
extreme and exceptional character'.
77
 Since the publication of the Committee’s report, 
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this proviso has been subject to criticism, on the basis that its inclusion in any new 
statute may reduce the effectiveness of the exclusions and just re-orientate the defence 
argument around exceptionality. These criticisms have been eclipsed now that, 
according to the draft Bill, the defence is to be narrowly circumscribed around 
conduct amounting to a serious indictable offence. Regarding domestic violence, it is 
notable that the Committee made a 'non legislative' recommendation that the Attorney 
General engage in an education campaign targeting the legal sector and the broader 
public about the realities of domestic and family violence.
78
 This has been ignored in 
the NSW government response. Furthermore, disappointingly, the recommendation 
that an amendment be introduced ‘to explicitly provide that evidence of family 
violence may be adduced in homicide matters’ was also absent from the NSW 
government’s response.79 
 
The judicial wrangling over what the characteristics that may be appropriately 
attributed to the ordinary (reasonable) person for the purposes of provocation, evident 
in R v Smith (Morgan) and Attorney-General v Holley, referred to above, has 
revealed that it is extremely difficult to limit the availability of the defence around 
normatively desirable cases without express prohibitions.
80
 As Norrie writes in 
relation to the defence of provocation in England and Wales, now abolished, ‘the law 
essentially declined to commit itself on what were good or bad reasons to be 
provoked’.81 As a result, express exclusions circumscribing the scope of provocation 
represented an attractive way out of this impasse. The exclusionary model therefore 
aimed to posit as a matter of law the circumstances in which an ordinary person 
would not, or rather should not, be provoked. The exclusions were designed to 
override jury sympathy in cases that have been declared to be, and labeled as, 
undeserving by the legislature. They also served to send a strong message about those 
factual circumstances in which provocation is not morally acceptable. 
 
The ‘positive restriction’ model 
 
Against the Committee’s recommendations, the NSW government goes further in 
restricting the partial defence of provocation. As mentioned above, by contrast with 
‘gross provocation’, as it was outlined by the Committee, ‘extreme provocation’ will 
be restricted to those defendants who respond with fatal violence when the conduct of 
the deceased amounted to a ‘serious indictable offence’. According to existing law, 
this is defined as an offence which, when dealt with on indictment, attracts a 
maximum penalty of five years imprisonment or more.
82
 The NSW government 
Discussion Paper defends this departure from the Committee’s recommendations by 
stating that it nonetheless achieves the Committee’s ‘policy intent’83 and it posits that, 
in adopting this approach, the government offers a ‘workable’ model for excluding 
certain conduct from provocation.
84
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The approach of limiting provocation to a ‘serious indictable offence’ was expressly 
considered (in the language of ‘violent criminal behaviour’) – and rejected – by the 
Committee on the basis that it would too severely circumscribe the defence by making 
it more like self-defence.
85
 In its Report, the Committee referred to this model as a 
‘positive restriction’ model and found that there was limited support for this proposal 
by Inquiry participants.
86
 While the government’s proposal refers to a ‘serious 
indictable offence’ and thus sidesteps the problem of determining what is meant by 
‘violent criminal behavior’ the substance of the concerns with this model remains.  
 
The major issue with this model is that it ‘fails to recognise the true nature of abusive 
relationships’.87 This could make the defence difficult to access for a person who kills 
in response to on-going emotional abuse, such as belittling, persistent taunts and 
criticism.
88
 It is not necessarily the case, despite the Discussion Paper’s confident 
assertion, that ‘ongoing domestic violence will generally involve serious indictable 
offences such as assaults’.89 As Julia Tolmie notes, ‘it is not uncommon for victims of 
domestic violence, including victims of severe physical abuse, to observe that the 
physical abuse is easier to withstand than the emotional abuse experienced in such a 
relationship.’90 In such instances there may be no acts of physical violence amounting 
to a serious indictable offence but rather a pattern of coercive control that entraps a 
woman in an abusive relationship.
91
 The government does not fully appreciate that the 
restriction might prevent women who kill in such circumstances from accessing the 
defence because, while it correctly notes, psychological abuse can amount to a serious 
indictable offence under s. 13 Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 
(NSW),
92
 it overlooks the fact that this offence requires proof that a person stalks or 
intimidates a person intending to cause the other person to fear physical or mental 
harm, which may be difficult to furnish in court. It may also severely restrict the 
availability of the defence in other cases in which a concession may be thought 
deserved but where no serious indictable offence has been committed, or where the 
link between the triggering behaviour and a serious indictable offence is not clear. 
Furthermore, as the Committee noted in rejecting the ‘positive restriction’ model, it 
may ‘leave open a window of opportunity for ‘less meritorious’ claims by defendants 
who have killed leaving no surviving witness, which is common in domestic 
homicides’.93  
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The only express exclusion which found its way into the draft Bill relates to conduct 
amounting to a non-violent sexual advance. While this is to be commended, it is not 
clear that this inclusion will have a substantive role to play in ‘extreme provocation’ 
given that a non-sexual advance would rarely amount to a serious indictable offence.
94
 
In this respect, it is tempting to suggest that this merely constitutes a formal and 
somewhat hollow acknowledgement about the unacceptability of homophobic 
violence. And if this is the case, it is all the more disappointing that provocation that 
is alleged to have arisen in circumstances in which the victim had been unfaithful or 
wished to end the relationship escaped even such a mention.  
 
In rejecting an exclusionary model of provocation, the NSW government noted the 
concerns that were raised about the efficacy of such a model after the decision of the 
Court of Appeal of England and Wales in Clinton, which concerned the new partial 
defence of 'loss of self-control'.
95
 As is well known, the defence of loss of self-control 
requires a 'qualifying trigger', which, under the legislation, may not comprise 'facts or 
things said that constitute sexual infidelity'.
96
 In Clinton, the Court of Appeal held that 
the exclusion clause was intended to operate only where sexual infidelity was the only 
'qualifying trigger'. The Court concluded that, in that factual context, it was not 
possible to take sexual infidelity (the alleged provocation) out of the broader factual 
context, and thus the defendant was able to raise the defence despite the express 
statutory exclusion.  
 
The issue that arose in Clinton, in relation to the loss of self-control defence, is one 
that courts in NSW could have faced in relation to 'gross provocation' had it been 
taken up in legislation. Cases involving allegations of provocation are rarely simple 
and often involve a complex combination of factors. Thus, potentially, an excluded 
factor may be combined with other non-excluded matters. For instance, in Green the 
provocation allegedly resulted not only from the non-violent sexual advance (which 
would be excluded under the new NSW model), but also due to the appellant’s 
sensitivity because of his knowledge or belief in his father’s abuse of his sisters. But, 
the Committee had concluded that the lessons from Clinton are that careful drafting, 
and clear statements of policy intent, are required to effect reform (and had also 
observed that a NSW court would not necessarily adopt the view of the statute 
adopted by the Court of Appeal in England and Wales
97
). The NSW government 
concluded that the Committee’s exclusionary model could have been ‘problematic’98 
and may not have been effective in excluding particular sorts of conduct, but such 
problems may not have eventuated. In any case, it is hard to overlook the central 
advantage of the exclusionary model – its recognition that provocation has an 
appropriate role to play in the criminal law, and its simultaneous clear communication 
about the unacceptability of provoked lethal violence in certain circumstances. 
Discretion to withhold the Defence from the Jury 
 
The Committee had recommended that the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) be amended to 
expressly provide that a judge is not required to leave the defence to the jury unless 
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there is evidence to suggest that a reasonable jury properly instructed could conclude 
that the defence applies. Here, concerns about the operation of the defence in England 
and Wales, which had been identified by the Law Commission, weighed on the 
Committee. The Committee noted that, while the trial judge has discretion about 
whether to leave the defence to the jury, it recommended that the legislative provision 
include an express statement to this effect ('that a judge should not be required to 
leave the defence to the jury unless there is evidence on which a reasonable jury, 
properly directed, could conclude that it might apply').
99
 The NSW government did 
not pick up this point in its response, noting that codifying this rule in this context 
alone, when the same general rule applies to all defences and partial defences, may 
produce uncertainty.
100
  
 
Conclusion 
 
It has proved difficult to bridge the divide between the usual positions taken on the 
issue of provocation (simple for or against), and the recommendations made by the 
NSW Committee can be seen to be an attempt to reconcile the varied views. Here, it 
should be noted that, by contrast with England and Wales, there is no mandatory life 
sentence for murder, and thus provocation is not able to be justified in instrumental 
terms as a necessary means of evading the imposition of a life sentence (although it 
did operate to allow a defendant to avoid the death penalty prior to abolition). In 
NSW the key issue was whether provocation should continue to operate to reduce a 
conviction for murder to one of manslaughter. The Committee therefore had to 
confront directly the moral-evaluative issues raised by the provocation defence.  
 
The NSW Parliamentary Select Committee was clearly divided over what role 
provocation should play in modern Australian society. The Committee expressed 
concern about the use of the provocation defence in circumstances in which an 
individual was killed attempting to exercise what the Committee calls 'equality rights' 
– to make autonomous decisions about their lives, including in personal 
relationships.
101
 However, the Committee also expressed concern that there were 
some circumstances in which provocation is 'appropriately used', such as when, after 
sustained abuse, an individual kills the abuser in an effort to defend themselves, or 
free themselves from a threat.
102
 Thus, the specific reforms advanced by the 
Committee were two-fold: to raise the bar on what conduct may amount to 
provocation by requiring that such conduct be grossly provocative, and to retain but 
limit the scope of the defence by articulating express exclusions regarding the sort of 
conduct that may amount to provocation. 
 
By contrast, the NSW government’s response suggests that the Department of 
Attorney General and Justice was not so divided, and the careful balance struck by the 
Committee has been lost. The government’s proposed defence of ‘extreme 
provocation’, to be available only where the accused was responding to conduct 
comprising a serious indictable offence, is unequivocal: provocation is to be severely 
circumscribed in NSW. While claiming to reflect the Committee’s policy intent, the 
government’s response departs in significant ways from the recommendations of the 
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Committee, and the reforms now proposed by the NSW government mean that NSW 
is out of step with other jurisdictions retaining provocation. If enacted, the defence of 
‘extreme provocation’ will represent a new stage in the evolution of provocation, and 
its incorporation into the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) will re-orientate the academic, 
legal and public debate. If the defence continues to generate controversial success 
stories, it is likely that this will be provocation's last hurrah in NSW. 
 
